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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. What specific issues were reversed and remanded by the Utah Court of 
Appeals from its decision in Anderson II and were Respondent's appellate 
attorney fees included in the reversal and remand decision from the Utah 
Court of Appeals? 7,8 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether the trial court properly complied, on remand, with the Utah Court 
of appeals decision in Anderson II is a question of law the court must 
review for correctness. Amax Magnesium Corp. V. Utah State Tax 
Comm'n, 874 P.2d 840.842 (Utah 1994). 
2. Did the trial court understand the breadth and scope of the remand issue 
directives from the Court of Appeals in Anderson II? 8,9, 10 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether the trial court properly complied, on remand, with the Utah Court 
of appeals decision in Anderson II is a question of law the court must review 
for correctness. Amax Magnesium Corp. V. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 874 
P.2d 840,842 (Utah 1994). 
3. There is caselaw handed down from the Utah Court of Appeals giving 
specific directives regarding when trial courts may consider awarding 
appellate attorney fees- did the trial court in Anderson II adhere to those 
directives? 10,11,12, 13 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether the trial court properly complied, on remand, with the Utah Court 
of appeals decision in Anderson II is a question of law the court must 
review for correctness. Amax Magnesium Corp. V. Utah State Tax 
Comm'n, 874 P.2d 840,842 (Utah 1994). 
4. If the Court of Appeals reverses the trial court's decision regarding 
Respondent's appellate attorney fees as reguested in this appeal, should 
Petitioner be entitled to consideration of her appellate attorney fees for this 
appeal? 13, 14 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The trial court committed error by awarding Appellee his attorney fees on appeal 
when the Utah Court of Appeals had not specifically remanded that issue to the trial court. 
In a Memorandum Decision issued by the Utah Court of Appeals in this same matter, Case 
#20070514 (Addendum #3), the Utah Court of Appeals remanded to the District Court 
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specific issues. The Court of Appeals directed that the trial court enter an order in 
accordance with the Court of Appeals directives which essentially reversed the initial trial 
court decision. The trial court awarded appellate attorney fees to the Respondent in the 
hearing on remand. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS/NATURE OF THE CASE 
A Decree of Divorce was signed in this case on April 20, 1999 (Record @ 46-54). 
Approximately six years later, Petitioner filed for a Modification of the Decree of Divorce 
(Record @ 59-61). On October 26, 2006 the case came on for trial. The trial court found 
Respondent to be in contempt of court for numerous violations of the Decree of Divorce 
and a judgment was entered against Respondent in the amount of $44,311.00. The trial 
court also awarded Petitioner attorney fees and costs and ordered Respondent to pay 
Petitioner $7,652.97 for her attorney fees and costs (Record @ 216-221). 
Respondent appealed the trial court ruling (Record @ 222-223) resulting in 
Anderson v. Thompson, 2008 UT App3, 176 P.3d 464 (Anderson I, Addendum #4). The 
Utah Court of Appeals upheld the rulings of the trial court with the exception of the attorney 
fee award which was remanded to the trial court with specific directives that if the trial court 
determined that it could enter sufficient findings to support an attorney fee award, the trial 
court could enter an order of attorney fees. More importantly, the Court of Appeals gave 
the trial court specific additional directives regarding considerations the trial court could 
make concerning the determination of Petitioner's appeal attorney fees also to be 
examined by the trial court on remand. 
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After the October, 2006 trial, subsequent Order to Show Cause documents were 
filed by both sides (Record @ 233-274). In yet another hearing Respondent was found to 
be contempt of court for violation of a different court order than the contempts of court 
originally decided in the October, 2006 trial. The court awarded Petitioner her attorney 
fees and court costs dealing with this subsequent contempt of court by Respondent. 
Respondent filed a second appeal, Anderson v. Thompson, 2008 UT App 170A 
(Anderson II) (Record @ 555-560 and Addendum #3). In this second appeal the Utah 
Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the trial court's finding of contempt against the 
Respondent stating that, "we remain unconvinced that there is clear and convincing proof 
that Husband knew what was required here, let alone that he willfully and knowingly 
refused to comply." 
In Anderson II, because the Utah Court of Appeals reversed and remanded on the 
central issue regarding Respondent's contempt, the court also reversed the trial court's 
award of attorney fees and costs to Petitioner. Also in Anderson II, the Court of Appeals 
gave specific directives to the trial court in its remand on the issue of Respondent's 
attorney fees stating that, "we remand to the district court to determine if an award of costs 
and attorney fees should be awarded to husband and, if so, to determine the amount." 
There was absolutely no directive by the Court of Appeals in Anderson II for the trial 
court on remand to address the issue of whether or not Respondent was entitled to his 
appeal attorney fees. On remand, the trial court awarded Respondent his attorney fees 
and costs and also awarded Respondent his attorney fees incurred from the appeal in 
Anderson II. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The District Court erred in its decision to award Respondent his appellate attorney 
fees and costs from the Utah Court of Appeals reversed and remanded decision in 
Anderson II. The Utah Court of Appeals did not specifically direct the district trial court that 
it could entertain this specific issue. If an appellate court does not give instructions to a 
district trial court to decide appellate attorney fees, that lack of instruction is tanamount to a 
denial of Respondent's request for appellate attorney fees. 
The only time a district trial court has the discretion to make a determination as to 
appellate attorney fees is when the appellate court decides and informs the district trial 
court that it may entertain that issue. 
Since the district court lacked authority to make this decision, the award of the 
district trial court to allow $7,463.04 in appeal attorney fees to Respondent in Anderson II 
should be reversed. Further, Petitioner should be awarded her attorney fees and court 
costs for the need to file this appeal due to the error of the district court. 
ARGUMENT: POINT ONE 
WHAT SPECIFIC ISSUES WERE REVERSED AND REMANDED BY THE UTAH 
COURT OF APPEALS FROM ITS DECISION IN ANDERSON II AND WERE 
RESPONDENTS APPELLATE ATTORNEY FEES INCLUDED IN THE REVERSAL AND 
REMAND DECISION FROM THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS? 
The Utah Court of Appeals set forth its decision in Anderson II on May 15, 2008 
(Addendum #3 and Record @ 536-540). Respondent prevailed in Anderson II and the 
Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the trial court decision regarding its finding of 
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contempt on the part of Respondent. The Court of Appeals specifically entered the 
following: 
1. remand to the district court for entry of findings on whether Wife should have 
been ordered to refund child support overpayment; 
2. reversal on the issue of contempt against the Respondent; 
3. reversal on the award of attorney fees and costs to Wife, which award was 
based on the holding of contempt; 
4. there is no basis to grant Wife's request for an award of attorney fees and 
costs for the appeal; 
5. remand to the district court to determine if an award of costs and attorney 
fees should be awarded to Husband and, if so, to determine the amount. 
In other words the Utah Court of Appeals in Anderson II reversed two issues and 
remanded two issues. These were the exact directives from the Court of Appeals to the 
trial court. 
Could there be any confusion whatsoever of what exactly was reversed and 
remanded. Could the trial court not have understood or misinterpreted exactly what its 
duties were in the remand process including whether Respondent's appellate attorney fees 
were to be addressed or included in its decision. 
Absolutely nowhere in the specific reversal and remand directives of the Utah Court 
of Appeals does the appeal court give the district trial court permission to address the 
appellate attorney fees issue. 
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ARGUMENT: POINT TWO 
DID THE TRIAL COURT UNDERSTAND THE BREADTH AND SCOPE OF THE 
REMAND DIRECTIVES FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS IN ANDERSON II? 
Because the trial court lumped all of Respondent's attorney fees into one large 
figure as requested by Respondent, that being $11,365.54, is it possible that the trial court 
did not understand what was required in the remand directives from the Court of Appeals in 
its Anderson II remand. 
In the hearing held on June 17,2009 before Judge Henriod (Record @ 417, page 5 
line 16) evidence was taken which insured that the trial court was aware of the specific 
several remanded issues and that the Anderson II remand did not direct the trial court to 
consider appellate attorney fees and costs for Respondent: 
Mr. Friel:... if we give respondent his attorney fees, this is not appeal 
fees, but his attorney fees, they should be $3,902.50. The dispute is their 
interpretation or their position is that since they prevailed with the order to 
show cause, and since Your Honor ordered, gave them attorney fees, that 
since they prevailed on appeal they should also get those fees. And our 
- the Court of Appeals did not specifically address that, which was - which 
was exact opposite of appeal number one. And our position was that 
Your Honor, after receiving evidence at the February hearing and in your 
minute entry ruling, found not only that we should be awarded the 
reasonable attorney fees because of the needs-based analysis that Your 
Honor did, but Your Honor then specifically awarded our attorney fees for 
the appeal. 
And the difference was the Court of Appeals gave this Court 
direction to do that. So in appeal one it said, we remand, or under appeal 
one was only remanded for attorney fees. Everything else stood on the 
contempts and all others. And then it said with the Judge Kouris ruling, 
since he didn't do the needs-based and reasonableness, it was 
remanded. So then the Court of Appeals gave this Court direction and 
said, if the court finds that there was need and does that analysis, then it 
can enter the attorney fees and specifically the court said, and the court 
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can then address the attorney fees for appeal number one. And so 
they're not disputing that. 
And the only reason I bring it up is in appeal number two and that 
page number 5 specifically then, Your Honor, I'm looking at Line 3 again, 
backing up just a little bit, it's says, likewise, there is no basis to grant wife's 
request for an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal. Husband 
argues that with a reversal he should be awarded his attorney fees and 
costs below," and we're not going to dispute that. But it doesn't say 
anything about his attorney fees for appeal two. 
And they're saying in the affidavit Mr. Richards provided in February, 
had a total of the pre-appeal fees of $3,900 - $3,902.50 and then had his 
appeal two fees in addition which I don't think, well, don't think - the court 
didn't say that they would be entitled to that... 
... (going to Record @417, page 9, line 16) 
MR. FRIEL: Thank you, Your Honor. I've tracked with Mr. Richards' 
calculations and I think we are together. The issue is did Your Honor 
mean in the minute entry to include all of his fees, which I don't think was, 
well, it was not set forth by the Court of Appeals, or was it just up to the 
time of the filing of the appeal? 
THE COURT: The answer is, I meant to include all of his fees exactly 
the way he put the order together. 
Therefore, on its own accord, in the remand hearing the trial court lumped 
Respondent's attorney fees and costs incurred up to the time of the appeal totaling 
$3,902.50 along with adding Respondent's appeal two attorney's fees of $7,463.04 which 
totals the $11,365.54 entered in the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
paragraph 24, (Record @ 818) and Order Regarding Fees and Costs on Remand, 
paragraph 2 (Record @ 821). It is Petitioner's position that the $7,463.04 which were all of 
Respondent's appellate fees awarded by the trial court, should be reversed. 
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ARGUMENT: POINT THREE 
THERE IS CASELAW HANDED DOWN FROM THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
GIVING SPECIFIC DIRECTIVES REGARDING WHEN TRIAL COURTS MAY CONSIDER 
AWARDING APPELLATE ATTORNEY FEES- DID THE TRIAL COURT IN ANDERSON II 
ADHERE TO THOSE DIRECTIVES? 
In the case of Slattery v. Covey & Co., 909 P.2d 925, 929 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) 
(Slattery II) the Utah court of Appeals dealt directly head on with the exact same issues that 
Petitioner is asking the Court to consider in the case at hand. In Slattery II, the Utah Court 
of Appeals found that the trial court had exceeded its authority on remand by awarding 
Slattery judgment for attorney fees incurred by her in Slattery I. The Court went on to say 
that its decision in Slattery I specifically declined to consider Slattery's request for attorney 
fees on appeal (See Slattery I, 857 P.2d at 249 n.4). 
The issue identified in Slattery II is identical to this appeal as the Court examines its 
reversal and remand directives from Anderson II. The last sentence of the remand 
decision from Anderson II states, "Accordingly, we remand to the district court to determine 
if an award of costs and attorney fees should be awarded to Husband and, if so, to 
determine the amount" (Record @ 536). 
Earlier, in the same paragraph the Court of Appeals states, "Husband argues that 
with a reversal, he should be awarded his attorney fees and court costs below". On 
remand the Court of Appeals did allow the district court to consider Respondent's attorney 
fees and court costs and Petitioner is not challenging that ruling. However, the issue 
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remains: did the Court of Appeals in Anderson II authorize or direct the trial court to 
examine Respondent's appellate attorney fees in its decision. 
Respondent might argue that since the Court of Appeals was silent on this issue the 
trial court could infer or take liberties in its decision to award the $7,463.04 to Respondent 
for his appellate attorney fees incurred in Anderson II. This is the exact argument used in 
Slattery II. Specifically, the Utah Court of Appeals went on to say in Slattery II that, "Our 
refusal to consider Slattery's request for attorney fees is tanamount to a denial of that 
request, thus resolving that issue against Slattery. A trial court cannot consider the issue 
of entitlement to appellate attorney fees on its own initiative because this decision is the 
sole prerogative of the appellate court." TS 1 Partnership v. Allred, 877 P.2d 156,160 n. 2 
(Utah Ape. 1994); Yorke Management v. Castro, 406 Mass. 17, 546 N.E.2d 342,344(1989); 
Vinton Eppsco, Inc. of Albuquerque v. Showe Homes, Inc., 97 N.M. 225, 226,' 638 P.2d 
1070, 1071 (1981); Schere v. Z.F., Inc., 578 So.2d 739, 740 (Fla.3d Dist.Ct.App.1991). 
The Utah Court of Appeals ended its decision in Slattery II by stating on the issue of 
appellate attorney fees that, "the only time a trial court has any discretion in the matter of 
appellate attorney fees is when an appellate court determines that appellate attorney fees 
are warranted, but remands the issue to the trial court for a determination of the amount to 
be awarded. Vinton Eppsco, 638 p.2d at 1071. 
Interestingly enough, when the Utah Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the 
trial court's initial decision to award Petitioner her attorney fees and court costs, the Court 
of Appeals in Anderson I did specifically give the trial court remand directives that it could 
consider entering findings to support a decision for Petitioner to receive her appellate 
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attorney fees. However, the Court of Appeals gave no such directives to the trial court in 
Anderson II regarding consideration of Respondent's appellate attorney fees and costs. 
Further, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed its decision on appellate attorney fees 
from Slattery in its decision in 2005 in the case of Cache County v. Beus, 128 P.3d 63, 539 
Utah Adv. Rep. 72, 2005 UT App 503. In Cache County the Utah Court of Appeals 
reversed and remanded the trial court's decision to award Cache County its attorney fees 
and court costs from inception of the case. In its reversal and remand the Court of Appeals 
followed the rationale it had developed in Slattery by stating, "The trial court had no 
discretion to award Cache County attorney fees it had incurred on appeal in Cache County 
I". The Court of Appeals went on to restate in Cache County II the exact same caselaw it 
had carved out in Slattery II regarding appellate attorney fees. 
POINT FOUR 
IF THE COURT OF APPEALS REVERSES THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION 
REGARDING APPELLATE ATTORNEY FEES AS REQUESTED IN THIS APPEAL. 
SHOULD PETITIONER BE ENTITLED TO CONSIDERATION OF HER APPELLATE 
ATTORNEY FEES FOR THIS APPEAL? 
It possible for the Utah Court of Appeals to consider awarding Petitioner her appeal 
attorney fees for this appeal. If Petitioner is successful on this appeal, Respondent would 
still have substantially prevailed in Anderson II. As the Utah Court of Appeals has recently 
pointed out, "there can be only one prevailing party in any litigation" (Chang v. Soldier 
Summit Dev.; 2003 UT App 415, 82 P.3d 203). 
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On remand, the trial court followed the directives of the Utah Court of Appeals by its 
consideration of Respondent's costs and attorney fees. The trial court entered an award of 
attorney fees and costs in favor or Respondent for litigation expenses incurred up to the 
filing of appeal number two and it is Petitioner's position that the trial court also entered an 
order granting Respondent his appellate attorney fees from Anderson II, which was 
incorrect. 
As an equity or fairness issue, is it proper that Petitioner must expend a good 
portion of funds she is seeking back from Respondent based upon the trial court not 
properly following the remand directives of the Utah Court of Appeals. Or is this deemed 
as the cost of litigation and doing business? 
If the Court grants Petitioner the relief she is seeking in this third appeal between the 
parties, this means that Petitioner will have prevailed in two of the three appeal cases. 
Respondent filed Anderson I and Petitioner prevailed. Respondent filed Anderson II and 
Respondent prevailed. Yet, Petitioner will have received appellate attorney fees in 
Anderson I only. 
If this matter is reversed as Petitioner is requesting, there will be additional attorney 
fees needed and required for Petitioner to successfully finish what was a trial court error. 
Petitioner seeks an award of her attorney fees for the fees and costs necessary for this 
appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The reversal and remand directives from the Utah Court of Appeals in Anderson II 
are clear. Specific instruction was not given by the Utah Court of Appeals to the district 
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trial court for the trial court to consider awarding Respondent his appellate attorney fees 
and costs in Anderson II. Without that directive from the Utah Court of Appeals, the district 
trial court had no authority to issue an order granting Respondent $7,463.01 in appellate 
attorney fees from Anderson II. Therefore, the Findings and Order of the trial court must be 
reversed and Petitioner should be awarded attorney fees for this appeal. 
DATED THIS J day of AflUL<< , 2010. 
David J Friel I 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
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ADDENDUM 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ADDENDUM #1: Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
ADDENDUM #2: Order Regarding Fees and Costs on Remand 
ADDENDUM #3: Utah Court of Appeals Decision dated May 15, 2008 
ADDENDUM #4: Utah Court of Appeals Decision dated January 4, 2008 
ArtdersonL.appbrief3 
15 
ADDENDUM 
#1 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW REGARDING ATTORNEY FEES 
BRUCE L. RICHARDS (2737) 
DEAN A. STUART (7640) 
BRUCE L. RICHARDS & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Respondent 
1805 South Redwood Road 
P.O. Box 25786 
Salt Lake City, UT 84125-0786 
Telephone: (801) 972-0307 
Facsimile: (801) 972-0387 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LINDA ANDERSON, ) 
(f.k.a. Linda LaRee Thompson) ) 
Petitioner, ] 
v. ] 
GLENN HUNTER THOMPSON, ; 
Respondent. ' 
> FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
> CONCLUSIONS OF LAW REGARDING 
) ATTORNEY'S FEES 
) Civil No. 994300102DA 
) Judge: Henriod 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court on remand from the Utah Court of 
Appeals for an evidentiary hearing regarding attorney's fees on February 9, 2009. The issues 
before the Court were attorney's fees for the Petitioner's claim for fees after the Decision on 
appeal January 4, 2008, in favor of the Petitioner; and after the Decision on Appeal, May 15, 
2008, in favor of the Respondent. David Friel appeared on behalf of the Petitioner. Bruce L. 
Richards appeared on behalf of the Respondent. The Court heard testimony, received exhibits 
and has entered a Minute Entry indicating the Court's Ruling. Subsequent oral argument was 
heard on June 17, 2009 on Petitioner's Objection to Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law Regarding Attorneys Fees. 
r r\ a ^ < 
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Based upon the foregoing and good cause appearing therefore, the court hereby makes 
the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Petitioner has gross monthly income of $728.00 plus $2,061.00 in monthly child 
support, plus an annual child support payment earmarked for Christmas and birthday gifts in an 
amount of $2,200.00. 
2. Petitioner's income has been static for the past eight years. 
3. She works approximately 25 hours per week in a daycare facility. 
4. She previously cut and colored women's hair in a salon in her home, but does that 
only once or twice a year at the present time. 
5. She has remarried as of 2004, has an additional child, and her spouse earns $13.50 
per hour working full time. 
6. Petitioner testified that she can't afford her attorney's fees and needs help. 
7. The total family income at the present time is approximately $3,138.00 per month 
gross. 
8. Petitioner's family has a marital home, two vehicles which are paid for, and 
claims total monthly expenses of $4,982.00, with expenses exceeding income in a relatively 
small amount. 
9. Attorney's fees were not included in said monthly expenses. 
10. The parties stipulated that Respondent has the ability to pay. 
11. Petitioner's counsel bills his time at $200.00 per hour and bills his office staff at 
$40.00 per hour. 
12. Petitioner billed, without adjustments, $9,605.20 for the first appeal. 
2 r.noi oi 
13. The Petitioner's hourly rate is toward the top end of hourly rates for domestic 
work in Tooele County, but is not unreasonable. 
14. Billing out office staff time at $40.00 per hour is neither reasonable nor ethical. 
15. Office staff is not paid the $40.00 per hour unless the client pays, so Petitioner's 
counsel has exactly the same interest in the firm's accounts receivable as Petitioner's counsel 
has. 
16. A review of the time spent on the appeal does not indicate that increments of time 
expended on specific aspects of the appeal were unreasonable. 
17. Respondent clearly prevailed on the second appeal. 
18. The attorney's fees and costs expended on the second Order to Show Cause and 
second appeal are reasonable as to the hourly rate and the time increments for the tasks 
performed and were necessary. 
19. The parties stipulated that $512.00 could be subtracted from Petitioner's 
Attorneys Fees due to a suspension of Petitioner's Counsel's license. 
20. An adjustment of $ 136.00 is subtracted for charges related to the second appeal. 
21. An adjustment of $239.20 is subtracted for charges for secretarial services. 
22. The total of the three adjustments is $888.00. The net amount of fees and costs to 
be awarded to Petitioner is $8,717.20 for attorneys' fees in appeal #1 solely. The Court also 
upheld the attorneys fees awarded at trial in the amount of $7,652.97. 
23. The amount of fees and costs for the Respondent's counsel through June 30, 2008 
totals $11,365.54, which includes attorneys' fees for Appeal #2. 
24. The total amount of fees and costs to be awarded to Respondent is $11,365.54. 
These fees and costs are found to be reasonable and necessary. 
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25. Respondent owes Petitioner a net amount of $ 1,899.74 plus interest on the 
underlying amount after considering the amounts awarded to Petitioner and to Respondent and 
the payments already made to Petitioner totaling $47,416.73. 
26. The Court has on deposit from the supersedeas bonds and cost bonds posted by 
Respondent, a total of $16,300.00. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. On the first remand, the District Court was directed to consider the standard 
criteria for award of fees: (1) requesting party in need of assistance; (2) the reasonableness; and 
(3) responding party's ability to pay. 
2. Petitioner should be awarded fees in the amount of $8,717.20 for Appeal #1 plus 
the attorneys' fees awarded by the trial court of $7,652.97, plus interest. 
3. On the second appeal, Respondent appealed the Court's Order holding him in 
contempt. The Appeals Court reversed and remanded specifically stating: 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3(2), provides that, "in any 
action to enforce an order of custody, parent-time, 
child support, alimony, or division of property in a 
domestic case, the Court may award costs and 
attorneys fees upon determining that the parties 
substantially prevailed upon the claim or defense." 
Accordingly, we remand to the District Court to 
determine if an award of costs and attorneys fees 
should be awarded the husband and, if so, to 
determine the amount. 
4. Respondent clearly prevailed on the second appeal. 
5. Since the Appeals Court relied on the enforcement provisions of the statute, it 
does not appear that the District Court needs to use the same analysis as used on the first remand, 
that of need and ability to pay, but should consider reasonableness. 
4 r.noi n 
6. The fees and costs expended on behalf of the Respondent were necessary and 
reasonable. 
7. Petitioner should be awarded fees in the amount of $8,717.20 plus the attorneys' 
fees awarded by the Trial Court of $7,652.97, plus interest. 
8. Respondent should be awarded fees in the amount of $ 11,265.54. 
9. The net amount owed by Respondent to Petitioner is $1,899.74 plus interest on 
the underlying amount. 
10. The amounts held by the Court as supersedeas or cost bonds totaling $16,300.00 
should be distributed with Petitioner receiving $1,899.74 plus interest and the Respondent 
receiving the balance. 
11. An Order incorporating the terms of these Findings and Conclusions should be 
entered. 
DATED this }A day of September, 2009. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE STEPHEN HENRIOD 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
David Friel 
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Attorneys for Respondent 
1805 South Redwood Road 
P.O. Box 25786 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LINDA ANDERSON, ; 
(f.k.a. Linda LaRee Thompson) ) 
Petitioner, 
v. ] 
GLENN HUNTER THOMPSON, ; 
Respondent. ] 
) ORDER REGARDING FEES AND 
I COSTS ON REMAND 
) Civil No. 994300102DA 
) Judge: Henriod 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court on remand of two appeals from the Utah 
Court of Appeals. An evidentiary hearing was conducted by the Court on February 2, 2009. The 
Court entered its ruling in a Minute Entry entered March 20, 2009. The Court heard oral 
argument on the Petitioner's Objection to Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Regarding Attorneys Fees on June 17, 2009. The Court has entered Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. Based upon the foregoing and good cause appearing therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Petitioner is awarded attorney's fees and costs related to the first appeal in the 
amount of $8,717.20 plus the attorneys fees awarded at trial in the amount of $7,652.97. 
•^<P D'CTMICI C0URT-T00ELE 
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2. Respondent is awarded attorney's fees and costs with respect to the second Order 
to Show Cause and appeal in the amount of $11,365.54. 
3. The net amount owed by Respondent to Petitioner is $1,899.74 plus interest on 
the underlying amounts. 
4. The amounts held by the Court as supersedeas or cost bonds totaling $16,300.00 
shall be distributed by the Clerk of the Court with Petitioner receiving $1,899.74 plus interest 
and the Respondent receiving the balance. 
DATED this J ^ d a y of September, 2009. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE STEPHEN HENRlOD 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
David Friel T ^ 
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\ en 
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The Honorable Mark S. Kouris 
Attorneys: Bruce L. Richards and Dean A. Stuart, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellant 
David J. Friel, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Thorne, Bench, and Davis. 
DAVIS, Judge: 
Glenn Hunter Thompson (Husband) appeals from the district 
court's order holding him in contempt. He also appeals the 
district court's determination in that same order that Linda 
Anderson fka Linda LaRee Thompson (Wife) need not refund him a 
child support overpayment. Husband further argues that because 
of these errors, the district court improperly awarded Wife 
attorney fees and costs, and should have instead awarded attorney 
fees and costs to him. We reverse and remand. 
Husband primarily challenges the contempt ruling. "The 
decision to hold a party in contempt of court rests within the 
sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on 
appeal unless the trial court's action 'is so unreasonable as to 
be classified as capricious and arbitrary, or a clear abuse of 
discretion.'" Marsh v. Marsh, 1999 UT App 14, f 8, 973 P.2d 988 
(quoting Bartholomew v. Bartholomew, 548 P.2d 238, 240 (Utah 
1976)). "'To find contempt [in a civil case], the [district] 
court must find from clear and convincing proof that the 
contemnor knew what was required, had the ability to comply, and 
willfully and knowingly failed and refused to do so.'" Id. \ 10 
(quoting Kunzler v. 0!Dell, 855 P.2d 270, 275 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993)) . 
Here, the first action causing the district court to hold 
Husband in contempt was Husband's holding of a family meeting in 
which he told the children to forgive Wife and made statements 
that because of Wife he could no longer give them a big Christmas 
or take them on trips and vacations. The actions causing the 
court to hold Husband in contempt the second time were his 
knowing that his new wife made the notation "B" on the memo area 
of two support checks and his delivery of one of these checks to 
the parties' oldest child for him to give to Wife. The district 
court determined that such actions violated a provision of the 
parties' divorce decree, which stated that "[t]he parties shall 
work together to resolve issues involving the children."2 The 
court made the specific finding that "[Husband] was aware of the 
1. Wife argues that we should not reach Husband's argument 
regarding contempt because he has failed to marshal the evidence 
as required by Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, %% 76-80, 100 P.3d 
1177. Although often referred to as a "finding" of contempt, the 
contempt determination here is not a true factual finding that 
would require a party challenging it to marshal the evidence. 
Rather, this is a legal conclusion that must be supported by 
factual findings. We do not see that Husband is challenging any 
of the findings of the district court regarding his actions or 
his awareness of the divorce decree; he instead challenges the 
legal conclusion that his actions and knowledge allowed the court 
to exercise its discretion and hold him in contempt. 
Wife also argues that because Husband sets forth the 
incorrect standard of review, his challenges must fail. Wife 
provides no support for this reasoning, and we know of no rule to 
this effect. Although in his initial statement of the issues 
Husband provides the burden of proof for contempt as opposed to 
the standard of review, this appears to result from the fact that 
his primary contention is that the standard of proof was not met 
and, thus, the district court had no discretion to exercise in 
this matter. Further, Husband quotes both the appropriate 
standard of review and the related standard of proof in the 
analysis portion of his brief. 
2. The district court also held Husband in contempt based on the 
court's understanding that in an earlier proceeding it had 
instructed that the children not "be involved." Such 
instruction, however, was never memorialized in the corresponding 
written order. Further, neither party addressed this instruction 
at oral argument, neither party provided a record citation for 
the instruction, and we see no such instruction in our cursory 
review of the court's ruling from the bench. Thus, we do not 
address this oral instruction allegedly given from the bench. 
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[d]ecree and certainly had the capacity to follow the decree."3 
However, the issue is not whether Husband was aware of the 
divorce decree but whether he knew that his actions were 
prohibited by the divorce decree. We determine that the language 
of the divorce decree does not establish the basis for clear and 
convincing proof that Husband knew what was required, i.e., that 
he knew his actions relating to the family meeting and the 
support checks were in violation of the divorce decree. 
The paragraph of the divorce decree relied upon by the 
district court states, in its entirety: 
That the parties are both fit and proper 
persons to be awarded the care, custody and 
control of the minor children and therefore 
the parties should be awarded joint legal 
custody with [Wife] being granted primary 
physical custody. The parties shall work 
together to resolve issues involving the 
children, however [Wife] as custodial parent 
shall make the final decision. 
When reading the entire provision containing the "work together" 
phrase, it appears that the term references making decisions 
regarding the children. Wife argues that this sentence should be 
read to prevent the parties from "working against each other." 
But the "work together" phrase, sandwiched between phrases 
clearly addressing custody arrangements and referencing decisions 
involving the children, does not prohibit any and all actions on 
the part of Husband that would be less than friendly. Although 
Husband's actions may have been, as the district court found, 
"deplorable," "upset[ting] ," and "appall [ing] ," such does not 
alone meet the standard of proof required to hold a person in 
contempt. As inappropriate as the actions may be, the simple 
fact that one party behaves in a petty or childish manner is not 
sufficient to justify holding that party in contempt for 
violating the general direction to work with the other party 
regarding the children. Indeed, " [for] a court order to be the 
basis of a finding of guilty of contempt for disobedience 
thereof [, it] must be clear and unambiguous." Foreman v. 
Foreman, 111 Utah 72, 176 P.2d 144, 156 (1946) (Wolfe, J., 
concurring). Thus, when it is not clear as to what the language 
of the order references, "the order [is] not sufficiently clear 
on that point to support the finding of guilty of contempt for 
disobedience of that element of the order or to base a judgment 
for damages for disobedience of that element of the order." See 
id. 
3. The district court determined that Husband could have 
followed the decree by taking the blame for his challenging 
financial situation, even suggesting that Husband should have 
told the children less than truthful reasons for the money 
shortage. 
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Wife points to the fact that this court recently upheld 
other holdings of contempt in prior proceedings of this case, see 
Anderson v. Thompson, 2008 UT App 3, 176 P.3d 464. Husband's 
actions at that time, however, highlight the issue here. Husband 
was previously held in contempt for his failure to pay child 
support, a portion of the children's activity costs, and spousal 
support. See id. ^ 19-20. Each of these responsibilities was 
specifically set forth in the divorce decree. See id. Husband 
was also held in contempt for his failure to provide, as 
previously stipulated, the tax documents from which the decree-
ordered support would be calculated. See id. f 18. Husband's 
obligations on these matters are set forth in clear language in 
the divorce decree and are not derived from the general statement 
that the parties must work together on issues involving the 
children. Thus, we remain unconvinced that there is clear and 
convincing proof that Husband knew what was required here, let 
alone that he willfully and knowingly refused to comply. 
Husband next argues that Wife should have been ordered to 
refund his child support overpayment for January 2 007.4 Having 
determined that Husband overpaid, the court's entire reference to 
this issue is the following: "Regarding the issue of refunding 
$455.08 from [Wife] to [Husband] concerning the difference in the 
January child support payment is ruled in favor of [Wife]. 
Therefore, [Wife] has no need to refund those monies." Without 
findings supporting this ruling, we cannot determine the basis 
for the denial of the refund. Indeed, in response to Husband's 
argument, Wife only speculates that this denial was "probably" 
because Husband was held in contempt and because monies were 
still owing to Wife. Adequate findings of fact " 'show that the 
court's judgment or decree follows logically from, and is 
4. Wife argues that we should not consider this issue, asserting 
that Husband failed to "properly raise[]" the issue because he 
did not include it among those issues listed in his "Statement of 
Issues" section. We agree that rule 24 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure requires that this issue be included among 
the initial listing of issues in Husband's brief. See Utah R. 
App. P. 24(a) (5) . And we recognize that we may disregard or 
strike briefs that do not comply with the requirements of rule 
24. See id. R. 24 (k) . "However, we are not obligated to strike 
or disregard a marginal or inadequate brief," State v. Gamblin, 
2000 UT 44, 1[ 8, 1 P.3d 1108 (emphasis added), and we usually 
reserve such a harsh sanction for cases where the noncompliance 
with rule 24 is much more egregious than that here, see, e.g., 
MacKay v. Hardy, 973 P.2d 941, 948 (Utah 1998) (disregarding 
issues raised in a brief that "fail[ed] to comply with almost 
every requirement set forth in rule 24") . Here, where the 
failure to comply with the requirements of rule 24 was fairly 
minor, where the argument was presented with sufficient clarity 
in the analysis portion of the brief, and where the noncompliance 
does not frustrate the purposes behind rule 24, see id, at 94 9, 
we decline to exercise our discretion to impose a sanction under 
rule 24 . 
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supported by, the evidence. The findings should be sufficiently 
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the 
steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was 
reached.1" Armed Forces Ins. Exch, v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, 
H 28, 70 P.3d 35 (quoting Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 
(Utah 1987)) . 
If the findings of fact in a case are 
incomplete, the court may order the trial 
court . . . to supplement, modify, or 
complete the findings to make them conform to 
the issues presented and the facts as found 
from the evidence and may direct the trial 
court . . . to enter judgment in accordance 
with the findings as revised. 
Utah R. App. P. 30(a). We therefore remand to the district court 
for entry of findings on this issue and an entry of an order in 
accordance with those findings. 
Because we reverse on the issue of contempt, we reverse the 
award of attorney fees and costs to Wife, which award was based 
on the holding of contempt. Likewise, there is no basis to grant 
Wife's request for an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal. 
Husband argues that with a reversal, he should be awarded his 
attorney fees and costs below. Utah Code section 30-3-3(2) 
provides that "[i]n any action to enforce an order of custody, 
parent-time, child support, alimony, or division of property in a 
domestic case, the court may award costs and attorney fees upon 
determining that the party substantially prevailed upon the claim 
or defense.1' Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3(2) (2007). Accordingly, we 
remand to the district court to determine if an award of costs 
and attorney fees should be awarded to Husband and, if so, to 
determine the amount. 
WE CONCUR: 
I, the undersigned, Clerk of the Utah Court of 
Appeals, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a 
full, true and correct copy of an original document 
on file in the Utah Court of Appeals. In testimony 
whereof, I have set my hand and affixed the seal of 
fc^^^tjsa Collins, 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
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McHUGH, Judge: 
fl Respondent Glenn Thompson (Husband) appeals from the trial 
court's order, which awarded Petitioner Linda Anderson (Wife) a 
judgment, found Husband in contempt of court for violating the 
parties1 Decree of Divorce, and awarded attorney fees to Wife. 
We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for the entry of 
more detailed findings of fact regarding the award of attorney 
fees. 
BACKGROUND 
f2 Husband and Wife married on June 12, 1987, and divorced on 
April 20, 1999. Four children were born during the course of the 
marriage. Paragraph nine of the parties' Decree of Divorce (the 
Decree) stated that " [u]pon the termination of alimony . . . . 
[Husband's] monthly child support obligation shall be 
automatically increased each year by .7% (.007) of [Husband's] 
gross business receipts . . . in order to preserve the ratio of 
monthly child support to [Husband's] yearly gross business 
receipts." Paragraph ten of the Decree required Husband to make 
r* rs A n 
several payments to Wife "for the benefit of the children in 
addition to child support," including money for Christmas and all 
costs for "non-school extra-curricular activities and lessons." 
Paragraph twenty of the Decree required Husband to pay Wife "a 
reasonable annual 'cost of living' increase in alimony." 
%3 The parties also entered into a verbal agreement to resolve 
certain issues not addressed in the Decree. One aspect of 
Husband and Wife's verbal agreement required the parties to split 
equally the cost of all of their children's non-school 
extracurricular activities. A second aspect of the verbal 
agreement was that Husband would pay Wife's income taxes that 
were "above and beyond $1200 per month." Both parties complied 
with the Decree and their oral agreement until 2004, when, 
according to Wife, Husband failed to pay for the children's 
extracurricular activities and for Wife's taxes. 
1[4 In March 2005, Wife filed a Motion for Order to Show Cause 
and a Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce, both of which alleged 
that Husband had failed to comply with various obligations under 
the Decree, including his obligation to pay increased child 
support upon the termination of alimony. In response, Husband 
filed an Answer and Counter Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce. 
At the hearing on the Order to Show Cause, Wife's counsel stated 
that the parties had reached a "partial resolution and 
stipulation" whereby Husband and Wife would "exchange their tax 
returns for the years 2002, 2003, [and] 2004." Based on this 
stipulation, the parties agreed to reserve the issue of 
increasing Husband's monthly child support obligations for a 
future hearing. 
%S Approximately one year later, Wife filed a Motion to Compel, 
which alleged that Husband had failed to respond to a request for 
the production of documents. Specifically, the motion sought 
production of Husband's tax records. In an order dated June 2, 
2006, the trial court denied Wife's Motion to Compel without 
prejudice. In its order, the court noted that Husband's 
"response to the document request did not provide all documents 
requested, but set forth explanations as to why certain documents 
were withheld." 
%6 Wife then obtained new counsel and filed a second Motion for 
Order to Show Cause, which alleged that Husband had failed to pay 
for the children's extracurricular activities, to comply with 
discovery requests, and to pay increased child support. At the 
Order to Show Cause hearing, Wife's counsel clarified that 
Husband had produced some of the requested tax records, but 
alleged that Husband had failed to produce the "critical 
document" showing Husband's "gross receipts or gross revenues" 
for 2002 through 2004. The trial court also asked why Wife had 
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previously failed to enforce Husband's obligation to pay for 
extracurricular activities, to which Wife's counsel replied that 
Wife's view was, "'I'm not going to be able to get it out of him, 
so why should I try.'" Finally, after listening to Husband's 
arguments on the Motion for Order to Show Cause, the trial court 
stayed the proceedings and set a trial for the parties' petitions 
to modify. The court also ordered Husband to produce his tax 
records prior to trial. 
1(7 During trial, Wife's counsel asked Husband whether he had 
sent an email to Wife that stated, "'If you are successful in 
raising child support, the children will suffer.'" Husband 
denied making such a statement, and then Wife's counsel had 
Husband read from a letter written by Husband, which contained 
the above statement. Husband's counsel objected to the admission 
of the letter on the grounds that it contained privileged 
settlement negotiations. Ultimately, the trial court admitted 
the letter with all but two sentences redacted. 
1[8 Upon the completion of trial, the trial court entered 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The court determined 
that Husband had not complied with several provisions of the 
Decree. First, the court found that Husband had failed to pay 
for the children's extracurricular activities as required by 
paragraph ten of the Decree. Second, the court found that 
Husband did not provide Wife with "a reasonable annual 'cost of 
living' increase in alimony" as required by paragraph twenty of 
the Decree. Third, the court determined that Husband failed to 
provide his tax records to Wife as required by paragraph nine of 
the Decree. Further, the trial court made a specific finding, 
based on the parties' testimony, that Wife was credible but 
Husband was not. In addition, the court found that although Wife 
did not bring her enforcement action before the trial court for 
"a long period of time," such delay was reasonable because Wife 
had attempted to enforce the Decree several times without 
success. 
f9 Because of Husband's noncompliance with multiple provisions 
of the Decree, the trial court held Husband in contempt of court 
and awarded judgment to Wife in the amount of $44,311. In 
addition, the trial court awarded Wife $7652.97 in attorney fees 
based on the court's finding that "attorney fees are justified 
and necessary and reasonable." 
HlO Husband appeals. 
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Kll Husband asserts that the trial court erred by finding him in 
contempt for his alleged failure to comply with the Decree. "The 
decision to hold a party in contempt of court rests within the 
sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on 
appeal unless the trial court's action 'is so unreasonable as to 
be classified as capricious and arbitrary, or a clear abuse of 
discretion.'" Marsh v. Marsh, 1999 UT App 14, ^ 8, 973 P.2d 988 
(quoting Bartholomew v. Bartholomew, 548 P.2d 238, 240 (Utah 
197 6)). In a related argument, Husband claims that the trial 
court erred by "disregard[ing] the stipulation of the parties and 
the law of the case . . . in finding [Husband] in contempt." We 
likewise review this contention for an abuse of discretion. See 
id. 
Ul2 Second, Husband argues that the trial court exceeded its 
discretion by admitting a portion of a letter that contained 
statements made during settlement negotiations. "In reviewing 
the admissibility of evidence at trial, we give deference to the 
trial court's advantageous position, and do not overturn the 
result unless it is clear the trial court erred." Davidson v. 
Prince, 813 P.2d 1225, 1230 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Hl3 Next, Husband claims that Wife should be equitably estopped 
from receiving past alimony and child support and that Wife 
waived any right she had to enforce such payments. "The 
application of the facts to the legal standard of equitable 
estopppel is a mixed question of fact and law." Trolley Square 
Assocs. v. Nielson, 886 P.2d 61, 65 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) . 
Consequently, we review questions of fact "under a deferential 
clear error standard," but grant no deference to questions of 
law. Terry v. Retirement Bd., 2007 UT App 87, H 8, 157 P.3d 362 
(internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, "'whether the 
trial court employed the proper standard of waiver presents a 
legal question which is reviewed for correctness, but the actions 
or events allegedly supporting waiver are factual in nature and 
should be reviewed as factual determinations, to which we give a 
[trial] court deference.'" Smile Inc. Asia Pte. Ltd. v. 
BriteSmile Mcrmt. , Inc. , 2005 UT App 381, K 20, 122 P. 3d 654 
(quoting Pledger v. Gillespie, 1999 UT 54, ^ 16, 982 P.2d 572). 
[^14 Husband also challenges the trial court's award of attorney 
fees to Wife. "[A] trial court must base its award of attorney 
fees on evidence of the receiving spouse's financial need, the 
payor spouse's ability to pay, and the reasonableness of the 
requested fees. The decision to award attorney fees must be 
based on sufficient findings regarding these factors." Riley v. 
Riley, 2006 UT App 214, fl 25, 138 P.3d 84 (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted). 
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fl5 Finally, Wife asserts that she should be awarded her 
attorney fees on appeal. "'Generally, when fees in a divorce 
case are awarded to the prevailing party at the trial court, and 
that party in turn prevails on appeal, then fees will also be 
awarded on appeal.'" Shinkoskey v. Shinkoskey, 2001 UT App 44, 
U 20, 19 P.3d 1005 (quoting Marshall v. Marshall, 915 P.2d 508, 
517 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)). 
ANALYSIS 
I. Contempt of Court 
fl6 Husband's first argument is that the trial court erred by 
finding him in contempt of court. "Under Utah law, 'in order to 
prove contempt for failure to comply with a court order it must 
be shown that the person cited for contempt knew what was 
required, had the ability to comply, and intentionally failed or 
refused to do so.'" Homeyer v. Stagg & Assocs., 2006 UT App 89, 
<| 6, 132 P.3d 684 (quoting Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 
1172 (Utah 1988)); see also Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-1 (2002). The 
trial court ruled that "[Husband] knew there was an order of the 
Court and had the ability and capacity to comply with the orders 
of the Court" and that "[Husband] intentionally chose not to 
follow the orders of the Court." As such, the trial court found 
Husband in contempt for failing to follow paragraphs nine, ten, 
and twenty of the Decree. 
fl7 On appeal, Husband claims that he should not be held in 
contempt because he "paid all child support and spousal support 
as worked out by the parties" and because he complied with the 
parties' stipulation on production of tax records. In other 
words, Husband contends that he did not intentionally fail or 
refuse to comply with the Decree. See Homeyer, 2 006 UT App 89, 
f 6. We disagree.1 
A. Production of Documents 
^18 Both parties admit that they stipulated to exchange their 
tax records for 2002 through 2004. However, at the hearing on 
the second Order to Show Cause, Wife's counsel stated that 
1. Indeed, "[s]o long as [a divorce] decree stands, it is 
incumbent upon [the parties] to comply with it, or at least to 
exercise every reasonable effort to comply with it. If because 
of change in the circumstances of the parties it appears that the 
decree is inequitable, or impossible to comply with, [a party] 
may petition for modification." Osmus v. Osmus, 114 Utah 216, 
198 P.2d 233, 236 (1948). 
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Husband had produced some documents, but alleged that Husband 
failed to produce the "critical document11 showing Husband's 
"gross receipts or gross revenues" for 2002 through 2004. 
Furthermore, according to Wife, she did not receive these 
"critical" tax records until six days before trial. The trial 
court found Husband's testimony that he fully complied with the 
requirement that he produce tax records incredible. We defer to 
the trial court's unique position to evaluate the credibility of 
the witnesses. See Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598, 603 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) (deferring to the trial court's "superior 
position to judge the credibility of the witnesses and to weigh 
the evidence"). 
B. Child Support and Alimony Payments 
fl9 Husband also contends that he made all alimony and child 
support payments required by the Decree and the parties' oral 
agreement. After considering all the evidence, the trial court 
expressly found that Husband had failed to pay $31,997 in child 
support as required by paragraph nine of the Decree and violated 
paragraph ten of the Decree by failing to pay for $1726 worth of 
the children's non-school extracurricular activities. The trial 
court was in the best position to consider the conflicting 
evidence on this point, and we defer to its findings. 
f20 The trial court also ruled that Husband had failed to pay 
$3 8 08 in cost of living spousal support, as required by paragraph 
twenty of the Decree. Husband has not specifically challenged 
this finding on appeal. We therefore affirm the trial court's 
finding of Husband in contempt of court for his violation of 
paragraph twenty of the Decree. See, e.g., Chen v. Stewart, 2004 
UT 82, f 74, 100 P.3d 1177 (affirming because appellant failed to 
adequately challenge trial court's findings of fact by marshaling 
the evidence). 
\2\ In light of the foregoing, we cannot conclude that the trial 
court's action in finding Husband in contempt for failing to 
produce his tax records and failing to comply with his child 
support and alimony obligations "'is so unreasonable as to be 
classified as capricious and arbitrary, or a clear abuse of 
discretion.'" Marsh v. Marsh, 1999 UT App 14, \ 8, 973 P.2d 988 
(quoting Bartholomew v. Bartholomew, 548 P.2d 238, 240 (Utah 
1976)) . We therefore affirm the trial court's decision to hold 
Husband in contempt of court based on his failure to produce tax 
records and to pay alimony and child support. 
C. Additional Arguments 
[^22 In a related claim, Husband asserts that the trial court 
should not have found him in contempt because such a ruling 
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"disregard[ed] the stipulation of the parties and the law of the 
case." These arguments are without merit. As noted above, 
Husband failed to make all of his child support and alimony 
obligations and did not fully comply with the stipulation to 
exchange tax records. Indeed, Husband did not produce the most 
relevant tax records until six days prior to trial. 
^23 Furthermore, the law of the case doctrine is inapplicable 
here. "The 'law of the case1 doctrine specifies that when a 
legal 'decision [is] made on an issue during one stage of a 
case,1 that decision 'is binding in successive stages of the same 
litigation.1" Jensen v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 2003 UT 51, 1 67, 82 
P. 3d 1076 (alteration in original) (quoting Thurston v. Box Elder 
County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1037 (Utah 1995)). However, there are 
exceptions to the doctrine: "(1) when there has been an 
intervening change of controlling authority; (2) when new 
evidence has become available; or (3) when the court is convinced 
that its prior decision was clearly erroneous and would work a 
manifest injustice." Gildea v. Guardian Title Co., 2001 UT 75, 
U 9, 31 P.3d 543 (internal quotation marks omitted). More 
importantly, "the law of the case doctrine does not prevent a 
judge from reconsidering his or her previous nonfinal orders." 
Macris v. Sculptured Software, Inc., 2001 UT 43, *h 29, 24 P.3d 
984. 
K24 In an attempt to apply the law of the case doctrine here, 
Husband asserts that the trial court's order holding him in 
contempt is inconsistent with its prior rulings. We agree that 
the trial court accepted the parties' stipulation and later 
denied, without prejudice, Wife's motion to compel production of 
Husband's tax records. However, Wife later filed a new motion in 
response to Husband's continued failure to produce the documents. 
During the hearing on the second Order to Show Cause, Wife's 
counsel explained that Husband had failed to produce the 
"critical documents" showing his tax information. As a result, 
the trial court revisited its prior ruling and required Husband 
to produce his tax records prior to trial. Thus, any change to 
the court's prior ruling was brought about by Husband's 
noncompliance, and was well within the trial court's discretion. 
See id. (noting that trial court may reconsider its prior 
nonfinal rulings). We therefore affirm the trial court's order 
finding Husband in contempt of court. 
II. Admission of the Settlement Letter 
[^25 Next, Husband argues that the trial court erred by admitting 
statements in a letter authored by Husband, which Husband sent to 
Wife in the context of settlement negotiations. Husband further 
contends that the trial court should not have relied on these 
statements in making its determination that Husband's testimony 
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lacked credibility. In response, Wife argues that the statements 
in the letter were properly admitted because such statements were 
used to impeach Husband's prior testimony. We review the trial 
court's determinations regarding the admissibility of evidence 
under an abuse of discretion standard. See Davidson v. Prince, 
813 P.2d 1225, 1230 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). We affirm because even 
if the trial court erred by admitting Husband's statements, such 
error was harmless. 
^2 6 Husband has the burden of proving not only that the trial 
court erred, but that such error "was substantial and prejudicial 
in that [Husband] was deprived in some manner of a full and fair 
consideration of the disputed issues by the [finder of fact]." 
Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 154 (Utah 1987). We therefore 
must first determine whether the trial court erred by admitting 
the settlement letter. 
1(27 During trial, Wife's counsel asked Husband whether he 
admitted sending Wife an email stating that "the children will 
suffer" if Wife succeeded in raising child support. Husband 
responded that he had not sent such an email. Wife's counsel 
then had Husband read from a letter written by Husband, which 
stated, "If successful in raising child support, ultimately, the 
children will suffer." Prior to entering the letter into 
evidence, Wife's counsel informed the court that the letter 
contained "some settlement discussions" and offered to redact 
portions of the letter. Husband's counsel then objected to the 
admission of the letter, arguing that all of its contents were 
inadmissible as communications made during settlement 
negotiations. After a colloquy on the issue, the trial court 
instructed counsel to redact all statements relating to the 
settlement negotiations. The letter was then admitted with all 
but two sentences redacted.2 
^28 In order for statements made during settlement negotiations 
to be excluded from the evidence, "the party seeking to have 
evidence of offers to compromise or statements made in the course 
thereof excluded must show that the discussions in question were 
made in compromise negotiations." Davidson, 813 P.2d at 1232 
(internal quotation marks omitted). Husband argues that the 
entire letter contained settlement negotiations. More 
specifically, Husband states that the phrase "[i] f successful in 
raising child support, ultimately the children will suffer" was 
made in response to a specific settlement amount offered by Wife 
2. The admitted portions of the letter read: "If successful in 
raising child support, ultimately the children will suffer. I 
will no longer provide the additional help that I have in the 
past." 
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and was meant to demonstrate that Wife's offer was unacceptable. 
In response, Wife argues that statements made in settlement 
negotiations can be admitted for impeachment. 
1J2 9 Under rule 408 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, u[e]vidence of 
conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations is . . . 
not admissible." Utah R. Evid. 408. Rule 408, however, "does 
not require the exclusion of any evidence otherwise discoverable 
merely because it is presented in the course of compromise 
negotiations. This rule also does not require exclusion when the 
evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or 
prejudice of a witness . . . ." Id. Thus, although generally 
statements made during settlement negotiations are inadmissible 
under rule 408, there are exceptions, one of which allows for the 
admission of statements made during settlement negotiations if 
offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice.3 
[^3 0 As Wife points out, a footnote in our prior case law 
suggests impeachment as one permissible use of statements made in 
settlement negotiations. In Davidson v. Prince, 813 P.2d 1225 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991), we stated that "evidence of statements made 
in settlement negotiations can and should be admitted for 
purposes of impeachment." Id. at 1233 n.9. Because the Davidson 
court held that the demand at issue was not made in the course of 
settlement negotiations, see id. at 1233, its footnote regarding 
the impeachment exception to rule 40 8 is dictum. This statement 
reflected a then-existing trend among courts interpreting rule 
408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and similar state rules. 
See id. at 1233 n.9 (discussing several cases in which statements 
made in settlement negotiations were admitted for purposes of 
impeachment). This tendency to admit settlement negotiations for 
impeachment received much criticism. See EEOC v. Gear Petroleum, 
Inc., 948 F.2d 1542, 1546 (10th Cir. 1991) (" [T]he Court should 
decide against admitting statements made during settlement 
negotiations as impeachment evidence when they are used to 
impeach a party who tried to settle a case but failed. The 
3. We note, however, that for statements from settlement 
negotiations to be admissible "for another purpose, such as 
proving bias or prejudice of a witness," Utah R. Evid. 408, the 
negotiations must still be relevant. See R. Collin Mangrum & Dee 
Benson, Mangrum & Benson on Utah Evidence 183 (2006-07 ed.) 
(noting that a party seeking to admit evidence over a rule 408 
objection must show that the evidence is relevant). Indeed, 
under rule 4 03 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, any relevant 
evidence, including impeachment evidence under rule 4 08, "may be 
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice." Utah R. Evid. 403; see also id. 
R. 401 (defining "relevant evidence"). 
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philosophy of [rule 4 08 of the Federal Rules of Evidence] is to 
allow the parties to drop their guard and to talk freely and 
loosely without fear that a concession made to advance 
negotiations will be used at trial. Opening the door to 
impeachment evidence on a regular basis may well result in more 
restricted negotiations." (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
see also Edward Kimball & Ronald Boyce, Utah Evidence Law 4-131 
n.269 (2d ed. 2004) (stating that Davidson "effectively 
nullifies" rule 408 because "the jury is not likely to make much 
of the distinction between admission to impeach and admission as 
substantive evidence"). 
H31 In 2006, rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence was 
amended to state that evidence of settlement negotiations is not 
admissible "to impeach through a prior inconsistent statement or 
contradiction."4 Fed. R. Evid. 408. This amendment was in 
response to the division among the courts over whether settlement 
negotiations can be admitted for impeachment. See Fed. R. Evid. 
408 Advisory Committee Notes: 2006 Amendment, 28 U.S.C.A. (West 
Supp. 2007) (noting that 2006 amendments were meant to "settle 
some questions in the courts about the scope of the Rule"). 
According to the Advisory Committee Notes, "[t]he amendment 
prohibits the use of statements made in settlement negotiations 
when offered to impeach by prior inconsistent statement or 
through contradiction. Such broad impeachment would tend to 
swallow the exclusionary rule and would impair the public policy 
of promoting settlements." Id. Thus, Federal rule 408 now 
explicitly prohibits the use of evidence of settlement 
negotiations for impeachment by prior inconsistent statement or 
contradiction. 
1J32 Rule 408 of the Utah Rules of Evidence has not been amended 
to include an express prohibition on the use of evidence of 
settlement negotiations for impeachment of prior inconsistent 
statements. We recognize, however, the persuasive rationale 
behind the current trend among courts to exclude evidence of 
settlement negotiations even for purposes of impeachment. 
Therefore, we hold that the trial court erred by admitting the 
4. "When . . . there is almost no case law interpreting the Utah 
rule and the Utah and federal rules are identical, we freely 
resort to federal law as a useful guide." Oakwood Vill. LLC v. 
Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, f 12 n.l, 104 P.3d 1226 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Although the current version of rule 
408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is no longer identical to 
rule 4 08 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, we nonetheless discuss 
the federal rule as indicative of the current trend regarding the 
admissibility of evidence of settlement negotiations for 
impeachment purposes. 
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statements from Husband's settlement letter. Consequently/ to 
the extent that our dicta in Davidson suggests that evidence of 
settlement negotiations are admissible for purposes of 
impeachment, we now depart from that non-binding precedent. See 
Jones v. Barlow, 2007 UT 20, % 28, 154 P.3d 808 (noting that 
dicta is not binding on appellate court)-
[^33 Nevertheless, we affirm the trial court on the ground that 
even if it did err by admitting Husband's statements during 
settlement negotiations, such error was harmless. In order to 
prove prejudice, Husband must show that the trial court's error 
"was substantial and prejudicial in that [Husband] was deprived 
in some manner of a full and fair consideration of the disputed 
issues by the [finder of fact]." Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 
154 (Utah 1987); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 61 ("No error in either 
the admission or the exclusion of evidence . . . is ground for 
granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, 
unless refusal to take such action appears to the court 
inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage 
of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the 
proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the 
parties."). 
f34 Husband argues that the error was prejudicial because the 
trial court based its determination that he was incredible in 
part on the impeachment evidence. At trial, however, the court 
stated that its finding regarding Husband's credibility was also 
based on Husband's statement that "he was following all of the 
different measures inside of the . . . divorce decree, despite 
the fact that he admitted that in fact he was behind on a couple 
of them." The trial court also found Husband's claim that he 
misinterpreted the requirements of the Decree to be "unreasonable 
and quite frankly, incredible." Thus, the trial court's finding 
that Husband was not believable was based on at least two grounds 
unrelated to the impeachment evidence. We therefore conclude 
that the admission of the evidence of settlement negotiations did 
not prejudice Husband, and affirm the trial court. 
III. Equitable Estoppel and Waiver 
^3 5 Husband asserts that Wife should be equitably estopped from 
claiming unpaid alimony and child support because she failed to 
enforce the Decree for several years and because she accepted 
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payments not required by the Decree.5 There are three elements 
that must be met to succeed on a claim of equitable estoppel: 
first, a statement, admission, act, or 
failure to act by one party inconsistent with 
a claim later asserted; next, reasonable 
action or inaction by the other party taken 
or not taken on the basis of the first 
party's statement, admission, act or failure 
to act; and, third, injury to the second 
party that would result from allowing the 
first party to contradict or repudiate such 
statement, admission, act, or failure to act. 
Youncrblood v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2007 UT 28, <fl 14, 158 P.3d 
1088 (internal quotation marks omitted). In essence, Husband 
claims that Wife's failure to enforce the Decree and acceptance 
of certain payments reasonably led him to comply only partially 
with the Decree, and that it would be inequitable to require 
Husband to pay the full amount of unpaid alimony and child 
support at this late date. 
|^3 6 In response, Wife argues that estoppel is inappropriate 
because her actions demonstrated a desire to enforce fully the 
Decree. We agree. At trial, Wife testified that " [f ] or the 
first few years" after the parties' divorce, she frequently 
requested to exchange tax documents and go over expense receipts 
with Husband. Further, Wife testified that she felt that Husband 
would never give her the proper documentation and that the only 
way to enforce the Decree fully would be through litigation. 
Again, the trial court expressly found that Wife's testimony was 
credible, which finding we defer to on appellate review. See 
Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598, 603 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 
(deferring to the trial court's "superior position to judge the 
5. Wife contends that Husband failed to preserve his estoppel 
argument for appeal. See Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, f 15, 164 
P.3d 366 ("Generally, in order to preserve an issue for appeal 
the issue must be presented to the trial court in such a way that 
the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue." 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). Our review of the record, 
however, reveals that Husband specifically argued the issue of 
estoppel in the second Motion on the Order to Show Cause and 
during the trial. We therefore address the merits of Husband's 
estoppel claim. 
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credibility of the witnesses and to weigh the evidence"). We 
therefore reject Husband's equitable estoppel claim.6 
[^37 In a similar vein, Husband argues that "[Wife's] actions in 
not pursuing recovery of past support and acceptance of payments 
not required by [the Decree] constitute a waiver" of her right to 
enforce the Decree. "A waiver is the intentional relinquishment 
of a known right. To constitute a waiver, there must be an 
existing right, benefit, or advantage, a knowledge of its 
existence, and an intention to relinquish it. [The 
relinquishment] must be distinctly made, although it may be 
express or implied." Flake v. Flake, 2003 UT 17, % 29, 71 P.3d 
589 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
H38 Wife again claims that Husband failed to preserve this issue 
for appeal. See Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, f 15, 164 P.3d 366 
(discussing necessity of preserving issues for appeal). We 
agree. Because Husband raises his waiver argument for the first 
time on appeal, and has failed to cite where in the record his 
argument is preserved, we refuse to address the merits of this 
claim. See, e.g., Tindley v. Salt Lake City Sch. Dist., 2005 UT 
30, f 10 n.2, 116 P.3d 295 ("With limited exceptions, the 
practice of this court has been to decline consideration of 
issues raised for the first time on appeal." (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
IV. Attorney Fees 
t39 Husband challenges the trial court's award of attorney fees 
to Wife. Husband's primary argument is that attorney fees were 
improper because the trial court should not have found him in 
contempt of court. Given our disposition of Husband's challenge 
to the contempt finding, we must reject this argument. Husband 
also alleges, however, that the trial court did not enter 
6. We note also that "'[t]he right to support from the parents 
belongs to the minor children and is not subject to being 
bartered away, extinguished, estopped or in any way defeated by 
the agreement or conduct of the parents.1" Andrus v. Andrus, 
2007 UT App 291, f 14, 169 P.3d 754 (quoting Hills v. Hills, 638 
P.2d 516, 517 (Utah 1981)); but see Department of Human Servs. ex 
rel. Parker v. Irizarry, 945 P.2d 676, 680 (Utah 1997) (holding 
that mother may, by her actions or representations, be precluded 
from recovering past due installments of support money to 
reimburse her for child rearing expenses she incurred before 
father's paternity was established). Thus, even if Husband were 
to succeed on his estoppel claim, Wife's actions could not 
curtail the right of the children to receive future child support 
from Husband. 
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sufficient findings on the reasonableness of Wife's attorney fees 
or Wife's need for such fees. We agree. 
f40 Under Utah Code section 30-3-3, a trial court "may order a 
party to pay the costs, attorney fees, and witness fees . . . of 
the other party to enable the other party to prosecute or defend 
the action." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3(1) (2007). "In doing so, 
however, the trial court must base its award of attorney fees 'on 
evidence of the receiving spouse's financial need, the payor 
spouse's ability to pay, and the reasonableness of the requested 
fees.'" Riley v. Riley, 2006 UT App 214, fl 25, 138 P.3d 84 
(quoting Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942, 947 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998)). Further, "[t]he decision to award attorney fees 'must be 
based on sufficient findings regarding these factors.'" Id. 
(quoting Shinkoskey v. Shinkoskey, 2001 UT App 44, f 18, 19 P.3d 
1005) . 
f41 Here, the trial court awarded Wife $7652 in attorney fees. 
In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the court 
concluded that attorney fees were "justified and necessary and 
reasonable." The court also instructed Wife's counsel to 
"prepare an affidavit of attorney fees incurred by [Wife]." 
Because the trial court did not set forth findings of fact to 
support this conclusion, there is no evidence in the court's 
order "of the receiving spouse's financial need, the payor 
spouse's ability to pay, and the reasonableness of the requested 
fees," id. U 25 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Consequently, we agree with Husband and hold that the trial court 
failed to make the findings of fact needed to support an award of 
attorney fees to Wife. 
1f4 2 "'The trial court . . . must make the findings of fact 
explicit in support of its legal conclusions . . . . Without 
adequate findings of fact, there can be no meaningful appellate 
review.'" Shinkoskey, 2001 UT App 44, f 18 (omissions in 
original) (quoting Willey v. Willey, 951 P. 2d 226, 230 (Utah 
1997)). Furthermore, "'unless the record clearly and 
uncontrovertedly supports the trial court's decision, the absence 
of adequate findings of fact ordinarily requires remand for more 
detailed findings by the trial court.'" Id. (quoting Woodward v. 
Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 478 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)). 
[^43 Finally, Wife urges this court to award her attorney fees on 
appeal. "[W]hen fees in a divorce case are awarded to the 
prevailing party at the trial court, and that party in turn 
prevails on appeal, then fees will also be awarded on appeal." 
Id. f 2 0 (internal quotation marks omitted). We have previously 
held, however, that 
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[b]ecause the trial court did not make 
sufficient findings to support the award of 
attorney fees to [the receiving spouse], we 
cannot determine if she should be awarded 
fees on appeal. However, if the trial court 
determines it can make sufficient findings on 
each of the factors required to support the 
award then [the receiving spouse] should also 
receive her reasonable fees on appeal. 
Id. We therefore deny Wife's request for attorney fees on appeal 
at this time, but if the trial court determines that it can enter 
sufficient findings of fact to support such an award, the court 
may also grant Wife her attorney fees on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
[^44 The trial court properly held Husband in contempt of court 
for his intentional violation of the Decree. Although the court 
exceeded its discretion by admitting Husband's statements from 
the settlement letter, the error was harmless because such 
statements were merely cumulative of other reasons the trial 
court found Husband's testimony incredible. We also hold that 
Wife is not estopped from enforcing the Decree and that Husband 
did not preserve his waiver argument. We reverse the trial 
court1s award of attorney fees to Wife and remand for the entry 
of sufficient findings of fact. 
[^4 5 Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further 
proceedings in part. 
I, the undersigned. Clerk of the Utah Court of 
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